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Discussion of Papers 




The papers in this session offer an interesting geographical 
and topical cross section of recent legislative efforts. Even 
this small sample of the 50 states considered most of the ma 
jor areas of reform, from wage loss to rate-making to re 
vamping the exclusive remedy doctrine. However, it seems to 
me that the session's most significant message transcends the 
specifics of any of the proposed changes. I think a crucial 
lesson resides in the collection of legislative stories related, 
that is, in the descriptions of the reform process itself.
One can hardly read the four papers together without im 
agining the legislative halls around the country as so many 
war zones. This impression is not much affected by the 
ultimate outcome—even successful efforts come with a 
struggle. I suppose that is the nature of our democratic pro 
cess. Much as we may wish it were otherwise, it remains true 
that our system of collective rule-making is far from costless. 
But the production of legislation is subject to the same prin 
ciples that apply to production of all goods we value. That 
includes the principle that a variety of recipes exist for pro 
ducing any given final product. For any desired piece of 
legislation there exist a variety of strategies for transforming 
the basic idea to a final statute.
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An economist would view the problem as one of finding 
the path of least resistance, the least-cost way of shepherding 
the proposed bill through the production process in state 
legislatures. Thus, how a bill is sold becomes nearly as im 
portant as what is being sold. The experience of recent years 
suggests that students and proponents of workers' compen 
sation reform have paid too little heed to this proposition. I 
find this all the more curious since workers' compensation 
has been a statutory creature since its inception in the early 
1900s. Participants in this area should be no strangers to 
political haggling and regulatory tinkering. Yet as Alan Tebb 
suggested of California, rather than master the vehicle which 
affects them, the real parties involved—employers and 
employees—"continue to abrogate their responsibility to 
participate in the establishment of public policy in the 
workers' compensation area." The events described in 
Michigan and Minnesota confirm this observation.
How can we minimize the confrontation politics that have 
plagued past efforts? Steve Keefe suggests that the usual 
political warfare over proposed reforms exaggerates the 
perception of an adversarial, employer versus employee rela 
tionship. Too often the image has been that one party gains 
from reform only at the other's expense. Labor interests 
have opposed reforms geared to reduce system costs because 
they expect the price tag will ultimately be a reduction in 
benefits. Of course, "reform" does not have to be a zero- 
sum game which precludes everyone from gaining. The prac 
tical problem in Minnesota (as everywhere else) was one of 
demonstrating that premiums could be lowered without cut 
ting benefits. Certainly, premium reduction requires cost 
reduction, but cost is not synonymous with benefits. A ma 
jor point of Keefe's paper is that proposed legislation was 
supported by studies that demonstrated just that. He sug 
gests that the crucial key to successful reform effort is a 
thorough, objective examination of prior and existing
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systems that illustrate how both business and labor interests 
can get a fair shake from reorganization.
The natural confrontational atmosphere that surrounds 
compensation bills is compounded when only anecdotal 
evidence can be offered in support. I think this session sug 
gests that the prescription for defusing this confrontation in 
any given state is (1) to carefully research the state's existing 
administration to clearly define the problems, and (2) armed 
with these statistics, to educate the political participants. The 
experiences related by the participants reveal that without a 
concerted effort to research and educate, the initial percep 
tions of a zero-sum game are difficult to dispel, with political 
warfare as a result.
A related point deserves mention. The suggestions above 
primarily address a strategy for smoothing the process of 
getting legislation passed. It should go without saying that 
the proposed reform itself should be based on research into 
the state's own experience. Nevertheless, a major trend in 
compensation reform, the wage loss movement, has ex 
hibited a remarkable propensity for generating a bandwagon 
effect. The approach has picked up national support among 
business leaders as the ultimate solution to the problems with 
permanent partial awards. Delaware's recent bout with the 
fever of reform provides an example.
Delaware has a full slate of scheduled awards as well as 
permanent partial awards for percentage loss of use and 
disfigurement. Benefits are paid through an agreement 
system, whereby both employer and employee must agree to 
the offered settlement before payment is made. An employee 
deals with the state's administrative personnel only in the 
event of a contested claim. One problem that has evolved is a 
relatively high incidence of contested cases and an average 
six-to-eight-month delay before initial administrative review. 
Of course, the greater the delay, or threat of delay, the
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greater the incentive for the injured worker to settle for a 
smaller amount.
As seems to be the case everywhere, a special commission 
was appointed in 1979 to bring together labor, business and 
insurance interests in an effort to reach a compromise 
reform package. Its report revealed that labor represen 
tatives were concerned primarily with delays in benefit 
payments, the prolonged hearing process and the agreement 
system of payment. The level of benefits was not a major 
concern. The reform effort of 1982 grew out of the commis 
sion's recommendations. The thrust of the proposed legisla 
tion was to streamline the claim procedure in order to 
(1) speed payment, (2) reduce the potential for disagreement 
over awards and consequently the incentive to contest 
awards and (3) increase the predictability of the size of 
award and when the issue would be resolved. Of course, the 
hope was that in doing so premiums would fall.
I believe it is fair to say that the impetus for reform was 
the concern over the cumbersome administrative process and 
backlog of contested claims (with consequent higher costs). 
Change in the benefit structure was an issue only because of 
the presumption that the type of benefits (not the level) con 
tributed greatly to the probability of contesting a claim. 
Although it is never clearly stated, I suspect the rationale 
behind the proposed solutions was the belief that abolition 
of permanent partial awards was a necessary sacrifice for 
streamlining the system, that effective administrative reform 
was operationally impossible under the existing benefit 
statutes. When framers of the proposed legislation were 
briefed on Florida's new "wage loss" bill, they en 
thusiastically seized the approach as the solution to 
Delaware's problems. Nevertheless, the rationale for the 
tradeoff was not effectively conveyed nor backed with 
statistical evidence from Delaware, or anywhere else. In 
stead, throughout the debate the image was that business was
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extracting a price (in the form of reduced benefits) for 
reform.
Labor representatives had expressed dissatisfaction with 
the old administrative framework, but once the proposed 
legislation started moving toward a vote, this interest in 
streamlining the program took a back seat to the perceived 
benefit reduction. Opponents of the legislation were careful 
to construct numerical examples showing injured workers 
losing thousands of dollars in compensation under the wage 
loss approach. The distrust over the permanent partial 
removal overshadowed other dramatic changes, including a 
proposed increase in the cap on benefits to 125 percent 
SAWW.
The proposed changes failed to pass, due in no small way 
to lack of the research and education effort advocated 
above. But I also wonder if a careful examination of 
Delaware's claim experience would yield the same recom 
mendations that were proposed? Such a study was never 
made. My point is that proponents of the move to wage loss 
in Delaware were easily convinced of the validity of Florida's 
legislation, without statistical support.
It has been suggested to me by several researchers that the 
gain from a shift to a wage loss approach varies depending 
upon prior state statutes, state workforce composition, and 
the accompanying administrative framework. Moreover 
(John Lewis' optimism notwithstanding), the papers in this 
session clearly demonstrate that the political road to a wage 
loss system is fraught with pitfalls and is potentially very 
costly. With the experience of several states unfolding, I 
would like to see a specific discussion of the feasibility of the 
approach relative to less politically volatile alternatives. I 
know of no published discussion at this time. Recognizing 
the constraints imposed by the political process of reform, I 
am wondering when the wage loss approach is the prescrip 
tion for states grappling with their permanent partial 
statutes, and when is it not.
